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"The rewards of new scientific knowledge will flow to those persons,
organizations and nations that put a premium on anticipating and shaping
4
the future rather than simply reacting to it."

INTRODUCTION

5

Woodrow Wilson once said, "I can use all the brains that I have and all those
I can borrow." 6 The Woodrow Wilson Center, created to bridge the worlds of
scholarship and policymaking, 7 adopted this credo of its namesake, and nowhere is
the remark more poignant than when applied to the mapping of the human genome.
Few areas of knowledge will have a more profound impact on our society than
1 This is the second in a series of Genetic Age programs supported by the Affymetrix
Corporation that are aimed at fostering a greater understanding of human genome research and its
implications for society. For more information, see infra note 5.
2 This article is based on a transcript of the event "Who Owns the Genome?" that took place at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on Sept. 24, 2002. The
webcast version of the event is available at http://www.geneticage.org/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
The event was co-sponsored by the Affymetrix Corporation. The Wilson Center and Affymetrix have
made the transcript available for educational purposes. The actual transcript in full text is
available at http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS/geneticage.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
3 Editor's note: The Review of Intellectual Property Law would like to thank Adrienne N.
Kitchen for her editorial contributions in converting the transcript of the program into article
format.
4 Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Welcoming Romarks to "Who Owns the Gonome7'; Sept. 24, 2002, at
http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS/leegenome.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
5 The introduction is comprised of remarks by Lee Hamilton, Director of the Woodrow Wilson
Center and Dr. Stephen P.A. Fodor, Founder, Chairman, and CEO of Affymetrix. Mr. Hamilton's
biography may be found at http://wwics.si.edu/mediaguide/hamilton/htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
Affymetrix Corporation, a co-sponsor of the event, began operating from Santa Clara, CA in 1993
and is now considered a leader in developing new technologies for analyzing complex genomic
information for use in biomedical applications.
The Affymetrix website is located at
http://www.affymetrix.com/index.affx (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
6 See Quotations by Author: Woodrow Wilson (1856 - 1924), at
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Woodrow Wilson/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
7 See Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, at http://wwics.si.edu/ (last visited
October 8, 2002) (noting the recent events at the center including "The Genetic Age 2: Who Owns
The Genome?").
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genetics. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a world changing more rapidly than the world
of genetics. Next year we mark the fiftieth anniversary of Watson and Crick's
discovery of the structure of DNA s one of the most profound scientific discoveries of
the twentieth century. Yet to put this in perspective, the sequencing of the human
genome was only announced just over two years ago. 9 The distance that genetic
science has traveled in those two years is astounding in comparison to its fifty-year
history. Future historians will refer to the sequencing of the human genome 10 as one
of the greatest scientific accomplishments of mankind.
In addition to the substantive research benefits that genome mapping creates, it
should be noted that the sequencing procedure may rank as once of science's most
12
Cavendish, 13 Millikan, 14
beautiful endeavors.1 1 The experiments of Newton,
Young, 15 Rutherford 6 and others are comparable to genome sequencing in that they
combine a simplicity of analysis with the beauty of science grappling with the
mysterious.17

The application of this knowledge will be just as stunning and also profoundly
challenging to public policy. How we prepare both the public and our policymakers to
deal with the flood of new genetic knowledge and its applications will be critical to
our ability to harvest its benefits in this new world that is upon us. As Dr. Rita

8 See The Structure of DNA, Crick and Watson, 1953, athttp://www.phy.cam.ac.uk/camphy/
dna/dnal5_ .htm (last visited on Oct. 18, 2002) (discussing briefly Crick and Watson and how they
discovered the structure of DNA).
See David Baltimore, Our Genome Unveiled, 409 NATURE 814 (2001), available at
http://www.nature .com/cgi-taf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v409/n6822/full/
409814a0 fs.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (speaking to the profound developments expected
following the unveiling of our human genome).
10See The Human Genome Project Information, available at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002) (citing the goals and current status of the United States Department of Energy
sponsored project intending to sequence the entire human genome; announcing completion of the
first near-complete human genome in June 2000).
11 See George Johnson, Here They Are, Sciencel' 10 Most Beautiful Experiments, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Science, Sept. 24, 2002 (referring to and describing the top experiments that have
grabbed the world's attention because of their "beauty").
12 See Sir Isaac Newton, at http://wwwgap.dcs.stand.ac.uk/-history/Mathematicians/
Newton.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002) (providing a brief synopsis of Newton's contributions to
science).
13 See Henry Cavendish, at http://chemistry.mtu.edu/PAGES/HISTORY/HenryCavendish.
html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002) (providing a biography of Cavendish including his well-known
accomplishments of determining the composition of water and his early measurements for the
density of the earth). See also Henry Cavendish, Experiments on Air, excerpted from
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS 75, 372 (1785), availableathttp://webserver.lemoyne.edu/faculty/
giunta/Cavendish.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002) (featuring a narrative from Cavendish's early
experiments on air, with illustrations).
1' See Robert A. Millikan, Biography, available at http://www.nobel.se/physics/laureates/
1923/millikan-bio.html (last modified Sept. 24, 2002).
15 See NEW BEER IN AN OLD BOTTLE: EDUARD BUCHNER AND THE GROWTH OF BIOCHEMICAL
KNOWLEDGE (A. Cornish-Bowden ed., Universitat de Valkncia 1997), available at http://bip.cnrs
mrs.frlbiplO/harden.htm (last modified Sept. 26, 2002).
16 See A Science Odyssey: People and Discoveries, Ernest Rutherford 1871-1937, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbliaso/databank/entries/bpruth.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
17Johnson, supra note 11.
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Colwell,18 Director of the National Science Foundation, remarked last year, "[W]e
need to develop a broader, more anticipatory perspective in our research. We need to
increase our emphasis on envisioning future possibilities, good or ill, as a mechanism
to predict." 19 Anticipation, though, is not an easy task, and the science of genetics
will challenge us in many ways. Thus, we need a much more vigorous and open
debate on both the science and its implications.
The public policy changes in modern genetics are formidable, made even more so
by the speed with which life sciences are advancing. A combination of public and
private resources is now driving progress, and we now have tools to enable whole
genome analysis. However, we should all realize that our knowledge of the human
genome is still vastly outweighed by what we still do not know.
20
Nowhere are these challenges greater than in the field of intellectual property.
Policymakers face the daunting task of constructing, interpreting and administering
a framework of laws and regulations that must strike a balance between the private
sector's need to reward innovation and the public's right to reap the benefits and
advances in genomics in order to improve the quality of our lives. The mission of this
conference is to address future long-term policy challenges to our society and
government. Through discussions such as these, we hope to better understand the
present and prepare ourselves for a future that will certainly hold many surprises
and present many obstacles. Patenting the genetic sequence presents potential
benefits and consequences to the economy and the public at large, and many of these
"pros and cons" will be addressed and challenged in this article from several varying
perspectives.
Section I, Part A of this article provides background information on the
patenting system in the United States, including its history and function as well as
outlining the requirements for a patent. Part B discusses the standards involved in
the patenting of genetic material and provides examples of drugs and tests that have
been developed and patented over time. Part C examines the progression of gene
patenting standards, including the utility, novelty, and non-obviousness
requirements, at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
Section II, Part A discusses the economic realities of patenting genetic material,
including the high costs of research and development, the various investment
methods companies employ, and the challenge of identifying a gene that will lead not
only to a potential cure but to a healthy profit margin. Part B presents a critical
view from the academic world on the qualifications of genetic materials for patenting
and outlines the ongoing debate between the scholars and the legal community. Part
C describes the ethical issues that arise when genes are patented and hints that
limited access to information and the potential for accidental disincentivation of
innovation may arise as the debate continues and technology advances. Finally, Part
18See Dr. Rita R. Colwelrs Biography, National Science Foundation, Office of Legislative and
Public Affairs (OLPA), at http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/forum/colwell/rrcbio.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2002).
19 See Remarks to the Council of Scientific Society Presidents at the American Chemical
Society Building, Washington, DC, (Nov. 19, 2001), athttp://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/forum/
colwell/start.htm (last visited October 2, 2002).
20 See Genetics and Patenting, available at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/elsi/patents.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2002) (providing a general overview of the broad issues involved in genetics and
patenting).
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D introduces a sample real-life scenario in the "Canavan case" and touches on the
consequences of patenting life-saving genetic "discoveries."
Section III suggests solutions to several of the problems in patenting the genome
that were introduced in Section I. Part A suggests that patent licensing procedures
require closer scrutiny by both parties involved - the researcher licensors and the
industry licensees. Part B encourages drug development to continue at later stages
of the game in order to foster competition and lower prices for actual consumers.
Part C advocates the establishment of standards in light of 35 U.S.C. § 103 to
determine a "real total value" of the potential economic and social returns of these
processes that will give investors as well as the public the benefit of their bargain.
Part D suggests that the USPTO and the courts reexamine the "inventive act"
standard and its application in order to guide the standards for patenting the
genome. The Conclusion of the article acknowledges that this issue will remain
controversial as technology advances and genetic innovation becomes more easily
applicable to and essential to solving medical diseases and disorders that affect us
all.

I. BACKGROUND

21

It is probably safe to say that when Watson and Crick published their
discoveries in April of 1953,22 they could not have imagined that their field would
eventually become a battleground in quite the way that it has. Two years ago, of
course, the world tuned in as President Clinton and Britain's Prime Minister, Tony
Blair, hooked up by satellite and announced a monumental achievement: the draft
23
sequences of the human genome.
Even as they spoke, commercial interests were following that research, and
for twenty years they have shadowed the public science of genetic research, because

21Section I consists primarily of the remarks of Justin Gillis and Q. Todd Dickinson, J.D.
Justin Gillis served as the moderator for this panel discussion. Mr. Gillis is a reporter on the
business news desk of The Washington Post and specializes in coverage of the biotechnology
industry. For more information on Justin Gillis, visit http://web.med.harvard.edu/healthcaucus/
bg-gillis.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002). Q. Todd Dickinson is a partner at the law firm of Howrey
Simon Arnold & White and is the former Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property.
Mr. Dickinson served as Deputy and then as Commissioner of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1997-2001. Mr. Dickinson has more than twenty-five years of
experience in all aspects of intellectual property law and public policy, including patents,
trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets and has written extensively on subjects from genomic
patents to e-commerce and IP enforcement in a knowledge-based economy.
22See James D. Watson & Francis Harry Compton Crick, A Structuro ofDooxyribose Nucleic
Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953), available at http://www.dna50.org/main.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2002) ("We wish to suggest a structure for the salt of deoxyribose nucleic acid (D.N.A.). This
structure has novel features which are of considerable biological interest.").
2:3See Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the U.K., The
White House Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 14, 2000), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/global/biotech/00031401.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) ([U]nencumbered access to this
information will promote discoveries that will reduce the burden of disease, improve health around
the world, and enhance the quality of life for all humankind.").
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they want to ultimately produce cures for disease. 24 The means by which they aim to
do that is by patenting the genetic sequence. For two decades, United States policy
has permitted private interests to patent pieces of the genome and the genetic
sequence. 25 For some time, this patenting procedure slouched under the radar,
evoking little public discussion or audible dissent. In recent years, however, the
dialogue has increased so extensively that we now have a vigorous debate about
whether the current policy is the right policy, and whether we are creating problems
26
for ourselves down the road.

A. The PatentingSystem in the United States
To understand the issues at odds here, we must begin by discussing the
patent system in the United States, namely: (1) what patents are; (2) what the
patenting process is; and (3) how it relates to genomics. Essentially, patents are
grants from the federal government that give inventors the right to prevent others
from copying their inventions. In this way, the title of this program, "Who Owns the
Genome?" is a bit of a misnomer. Inventors holding patents do not actually own the
invention - they own the right to restrict others' access to it for the statutorilydesignated period of time. Currently, that term stretches twenty years from the date
27
that the patent application is filed.

24 See Marshfield Clinic, Accomplishments in the Lab, Center for Medical Genetics: $22
Million Allows Additional Research of Disease-Causing Genes, availableat
http://www.marshfieldclinic.org/home/systemreview/mmrf/medical-genetics. asp (describing how a
$22 million funding extension will allow researchers to continue mapping disorder-influencing
genes). Lead scientist Dr. James L. Weber explained the goal of the further research, saying, "We're
hunting for the genes that cause disease. Once the gene is isolated, we can use it in prevention. We
can screen for people who have risk factors and ameliorate the disease." Id.
25 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Rights in the Human Genome Project,in GENE MAPPING:
USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 226, 226-28 (George J. Annas and Sherman Elias eds., 1992),
available at http://www.bumc.bc.edu/www/sph/lw/pvl/book2/14-Patent / 20Rights%
20in%20the.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (discussing the law and policies surrounding patents and
the human genome project). The work concludes that the main policy "rests on the assumption that
patenting helps to ensure widespread availability of the results of sponsored research through
commercial dissemination." Id. at 240.
26 See id. at 229-30 ("[P]erhaps the biggest danger that patenting presents to progress in the
Genome Project is that researchers seeking to preserve patent rights will defer publication of their
findings and thereby retard the dissemination of new knowledge... [A] potentially more harmful
consequence of patenting discoveries made in the course of the Genome Project is that patent
holders could restrict access to these discoveries in ways that impede subsequent research."); see
also Dr. David King, Statement at Human Genetics Alert Press Briefing (June 14, 2000), available
at http://www.hgalert.org/topics/lifePatents/patent.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) (discussing the
negative policies surrounding patenting discoveries made in the Human Genome Project).
27 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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1. Historyand Function of the PatentSystem
Why do we have this system? First, it is historically founded in the United
States Constitution. 28 The inaugural Congress of the United States crafted the first
patent law. The purpose of this system is to encourage innovation and also to
provide incentive for inventors to disclose their inventions, rather than keep them
private as "trade secrets." 29 In so disclosing the inventions, the inventors allow
30
others to take that novel information and build on it to move technology forward.
Patents provide monetary inventive and an economic underpinning for a great deal
of investment, particularly in high-tech or start-up biotechnology companies that are
pounded with questions by potential venture capitalists such as, "What kinds of
patents do you have?" and "How can you protect these new inventions from being
stolen by others?"
The United States government, through the U.S. Patent and Trademark
31
Office (USPTO) grants patents to a variety of inventions in broad categories.
Chemicals, processes, machines and apparatuses, among other things, are some
32
examples of "things" that may be patented. Any inventor may apply for a patent,
including a private interest inventor, a public sector inventor, any institutional or
university inventor, and non-profit organizations.

2. PatentRequirements
There are, however, limitations on the right to patent. There are four
statutory requirements that must be fulfilled in order to obtain a patent. First, the
patent must show a use or utility. 33 Much of the debate over patenting the genome
centers on where the standard for utility lies in the law at the moment.
The second requirement is that the patented invention must be new. 34 The
inventor must be the first inventor.3 5 If it is discovered that someone else invented
28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have the Power To... promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
29 See Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Wis. 1969)
("A trade secret is... '[a]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it. It may be a. . . process of . . treating or preserving materials."' (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939), superecded by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 (1995))).
30See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (explaining
the policy that the exclusive rights of the patentee are granted for a limited time, and then the
knowledge of the invention is given to the people, who can then use it without restriction). "The
attractiveness of such a bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing creative effort and disclosure of
the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the
exploitation of unpatented designs and innovations." Id.
31 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").

32 Jjd
33 Id3
m

Id.
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your invention before you did, and that is confirmed by a search of prior art at the
USPTO, you will not receive that patent. For example, during the course of the
human genome project, the National Institute of Health 36 would enter each day's
discoveries into an Internet database nightly. Interestingly enough, this created
prior art; 37 because they did not seek patents on what they invented when they
posted on the Internet, the practice created a priority against all others.
Third, the patented invention must be non-obvious. 38 The invention cannot
be so incrementally different from prior inventions that it is obvious to a "skilled
39
practitioner in the art."

Finally, the patented invention must be fully disclosed. 40 The laws governing
this are statutory and are hence subject to interpretation by the courts. Essentially,
this means that Congress and the United States courts carry much of the burden of
interpreting these disclosures. Yet at the ground level, the USPTO has to deal with
disclosure issues every day of the week.

B. PatentingGenes: Standardsand Examples
Genes, particularly human genes, present themselves as difficult subjects for
patenting, depending on who is asked. Genes are essentially complex chemical
compositions. 41 Chemical compositions, along with pharmaceuticals and other
discovered or invented chemicals have been patentable since the earliest stages of
the patenting system. 42 However, issues arise when genes are asserted to be

35See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (defining the circumstances in which a person is
not entitled to a patent).
'36See National Institute of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Mission,
available at http://www.nih.gov/about/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2002) (explaining that the Institute is
the "steward of medical and behavioral research for the Nation" and that '[i]ts mission is science in
pursuit of fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior of living systems and the
application of that knowledge to extend healthy life and reduce the burdens of illness and
disability.").
37 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (describing what constitutes prior art, thereby
barring patentability); see also Walter J. Blenki, Jr., Considering What ConstitutesPriorArt in the
United States 43 (6) JOM 45 (1991), available at http://www.tms.org (discussing the statutory
definitions of prior art under § 102 and defining prior art as "the entire body of knowledge from the
beginning of time to the present.").
38 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (describing the conditions that may lead to a
patentability rejection based on obviousness).
'39Id.

40 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring an inventor to include a written description, a
description that is enabling, and the best mode of their invention).
1' See Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 1348 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[D]NA is deoxyribonucleic acid, a generic term encompassing the many chemical materials that genetically control
the structure and metabolism of living things."); see also Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Found. for
Med. Ed. and Research, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18007, 3 ('[A] gene is a segment of DNA.").
12 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (stating that composition of matter is one of the four categories of
patentable subject matter). But see Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) ("An article of manufacture or composition of matter occurring in nature will not be
considered patentable unless given a new form, quality, properties or combination not present in the
original article existing in nature in accordance with existing law.").
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products of nature, as products of nature are not patentable. 43 A patent cannot issue
to something that is found in nature in its naturally-occurring form. The argument
follows that if humans carry their genes with them and are in fact composed of
genes, this could be considered to be naturally-occurring, as there is no outside force
at work or discovery to be had.
To mend this oppositional dichotomy as it pertains to genes, the patent issues
on the isolated and purified form of the genome. 44 Simply put, the chemical
composition must be discovered, isolated, and purified, and then put forward for a
use that has not been known as of that time. In this case, the gene is patented,
45
albeit not necessarily in its naturally-occurring form.
One example of a similar method of characterization involves the patent
issued on the drug Penicillin. Penicillin, as the familiar story goes, was "invented" in
1928 when mold in a petri dish was found to have anti-bacterial capabilities. 46 Dr.
Flemming then isolated the active anti-bacterial ingredient from the mold, and a
47
patent subsequently issued to the resulting drug, Penicillin.
A second example that illustrates the non-importance of the "human"
element in this patenting process is the patenting of human insulin. After the
discovery that insulin served as the active component in the regulation of sugar
metabolism, it was isolated and purified from its source, the human pancreas,
making it patentable. Over time, the USPTO also issued patents to naturallyoccurring insulin as well.
As a final example, the cancer-inhibiting drug Taxol, 48 when isolated from
United States' yew trees, is patentable. These examples show that significant
numbers of pharmaceutical patents, in particular, issue to naturally-occurring
substances that have been discovered and isolated from their natural sources.

C. Utility,Novelty & Non -Obviousness: Complexities in the Progressionof Genetic
PatentingStandardsat the USPTO
The three major issues involved in patenting the genome are the same as
those that affect every patent and are required by statute: utility, novelty and nonobviousness.
43 See Quigg
932 F.2d at 923 ("[P]roducts found in nature will not be considered to be
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 and/or 102.").
44 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (addressing
public concerns by distinguishing the patenting of a genome, which is not allowed, from the
patenting of a gene, which is allowed if done for a specific, substantial, and credible use).
45 Id. at 1093.
46 For a simple background of Dr. Flemming's "accidental" discovery of Penicillin, see
Susan Streble, The Evolution of Resistance to Penicillin (Dec. 12, 2001), at http://www.webpub.
allegheny.edu/employee/r/rmumee/FSI1/ResearchPapers/SusanStreble.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2002).
The drug was discovered when Flemming forgot to clean a petri dish containing
staphylococcus bacteria. Id. Where a ring of mold had grown in the dish, the bacteria had died. Id.
Flemming used his mistake to further research and develop the antibiotic he later named Penicillin.
Id.

47 Id.
48 See

The Taxol (paclitaxel) Story, at http://www.taxol.com/timeli.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2002) (outlining the history of the development of the drug Taxol).
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Discussion of these issues begins with initial inquiries posited as to whether
anything "inventive" occurs in the production of genetic data. After all, sequencing
machines calculate the data and generate the information - it would outwardly
appear as though this production involves little to no actual invention at all. The
rebuttal to this argument lies in § 103 of the Patent Act, which states that the way
an invention "comes about" does not negative whether a patent is issued or not. In
fact, § 103 was originally intended to challenge a United States Supreme Court
decision on the so-called "flash of genius" test.49 The result negates the idea that
tedious and conscientious efforts on the part of the inventor towards production of
her invention are required. Thus, whether an amazing idea for an invention comes
to an inventor in a dream, or while driving up the California coast, or over the course
of thirty years of meticulous experimentation, the inventor is still entitled to a
patent.
The issue of whether genes should be patented has been studied extensively.
There have been numerous public hearings both at the USPTO and in Congress, not
to mention countless private debates. The USPTO deals with these questions in a
manner that has developed over time. It has been suggested that the history of
patenting the genome resembles a swinging pendulum, in that the USPTO was
extremely restrictive when genetic patenting began and then shifted to a somewhat
looser standard. When the first patent applications for genes were filed, the USPTO
maintained step-wise, fairly restrictive set of rules involving "wet biology" in the
disclosure because of as-yet unclear utility questions.
The intervention of the courts changed this process. The courts looked to the
language of the Patent Act and applied it liberally, essentially holding that
satisfaction of the requirements entitled an inventor to a patent. As a result, the
USPTO went back to the drawing board and crafted, among other rules, a set of
guidelines for their patent examiners in line with the utility requirement. The basic
question of utility, after all, asks what use these inventions are being put to and for
what purpose are they sought out in discovery.
The USPTO received ample feedback from the public sector on their utility
guidelines. The guidelines had little chance to remain static, however, upon the 1997
Federal Circuit decision Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly,50 which cast new
light on the utility and disclosure issues. The guidelines were revised once more
after additional formal testimony as to its functionality in light of Eli Lilly.51 Once
again, the bar on utility guidelines was raised.
The Patent and Trademark Office now requires a three-part test of utility
that demonstrates a difficult standard to meet, one that is certainly much tougher
than the low-water marks of the past. Today an inventor must show (1)specific
utility, (2) substantial utility, and (3) credible utility. 52 An example of credible utility
may be demonstrated in an inventor's claim to cure a disease formerly thought to
49See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, n.8 (1966) (explaining that when it comes to
patenting an invention, "[i]t is immaterial whether it resulted from long toil and experimentation or
from a flash of genius.").
M 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,523 U.S. 1089 (1998).
l See id,
52 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("[W]here the
application discloses a specific, substantial, and credible utility for the claimed isolated and purified
gene, the isolated and purified gene composition may be patentable.").
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have no cure. The USPTO now requires the inventor to produce substantial
5
trustworthy evidence to support that utility claim.
The scope of these genome-patenting issues reaches far beyond what was
likely ever imagined fifty years ago. At the moment, roughly 6500 patents relate to
genes themselves or to open reading frames. Nearly 1300 of those patents are to the
human genes, although many more exist in non-humans, such as the rice gene and
the mouse genes.
Collectively, about 20,000 patents are pending for genes
themselves, fragments, snips, ESTs, and other genetic material.
One category that mixes in to the application pool is comprised of provisional,
or place-holding, applications.
Many of these never ripen into full patent
applications and become actual patents themselves. The advantages to filing a
provisional application, however, are that they require much less disclosure, and
they cost far less. There are currently about 30,000 provisional applications on file
54
at the USPTO.

II. ANALYSIS

55
A. The Economic Realities ofPatentingthe Genome

The premise of the human
about causes of human disease in
diagnostic tests to better our
pharmaceutical and biotechnology
of this goal.

genome project is to decipher as much as possible
order to find cures, refine therapies, and develop
existence.
That being said, privately-owned
companies conduct their business in furtherance

1. High Costs of Development and Production
To develop such tests and cures, however, requires a great deal of money.
The cost of creating a single drug that successfully passes FDA inspection and
reaches patients in the public market requires an estimated $500 million to $800

5 For an example of how provisional applications can be used in a somewhat "preemptive"
manner, consider that the biotechnology company Celera announced that they would file 6,000
applications to genes they had discovered. In reality, they meant that they were going to file 6,000
provisional applications. After later clarification, Celera elected to file only 300 applications on
actual gene sequence.
55 The remarks contained in Section A are those of Scott A. Brown, J.D. Mr. Brown is the Vice
President and Chief Patent Counsel of Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. In his position at
Millennium, Mr. Brown oversees development and implementation of Millennium's intellectual
property strategy, including procurement of patents, review of intellectual property aspects of
company transactions and analysis of intellectual property issues relating to Millennium's
activities. Prior to joining Millennium, Mr. Brown was Senior Patent Counsel at Genetics Institute,
Inc. and an attorney with the firms of Kenyon & Kenyon and Dorsey & Whitney.
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million investment by a company. 56 Public interests do not generally invest in this
kind of research and technology, and certainly do not do so at such high-dollar
levels. 57 While private sector remains the main financier of this remarkable
endeavor that ultimately benefits the public, it cannot and will not operate without a
return on that investment.
Hence, the patent system plays a huge role in obtaining the investment that
spawns these companies. Patent protection of the products of these industries
ensures that investors and shareholders will recoup their initial capital and
58
subsequent investments.

2. Investment Methods and the PatentLure

There are three forms of investment, particularly in the biotech industry,
that must be retained in order to produce successful pharmaceuticals. The three
investment methods share a common theme, with the patent serving as the security
on the multi-million dollar investments that get drugs on the market for public
benefit.
Initially, one must obtain the venture capital to get the company started; to
do that, there must be a great idea for a cure or test that is the product of very basic
research. The first questions the venture capitalist will ask are whether a patent

56 See Joe Moser, The Cost of New Drugs: A Fact Sheet, GALEN INSTITUTE (May 7, 2002),
availahbe at http://www.galen.org/news/050702.html (last visited on October 18, 2002) (listing the
average cost of developing a new drug at $802 million USD); see also James Love, How Much Does
It Cost to Develop a New Drug?, Consumer Project
on Technology, (April 2, 2002) at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/healtl/econ/howmuch.html (presenting report written for a meeting of the
MSF Working Group on Research and Development in Geneva on April 2, 2000, showing how much
it costs to develop new drugs).
57 However, public academic institutions also file their fair share of patents. The Regents of
the University of California system, for example, is known as the birthplace of biotechnology and
genomic research and owns one of the largest collections of patents; they also license patents to
private interests.
See University of California, Los Angeles, UCLA Patents (Selected), at
http://www.research.ucls.edu/patents/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (showing UCLA issued patents
from 1997 to 2002); see also The Regents of University of California, UCLA Research Expertise, at
http://www.research.ucla.edu/faculty (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (providing search engine to find
faculty at the Regents of University of California who specialize in genetic research); UCLA Office of
Intellectual
Property,
Inventions
A vailable
for
Licensing,
at
http://www.research.ucla.edu/oipa/industry.htm#invention (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) (displaying
numerous UCLA patents in various areas of science and technology which are available for
licensing).
5S See generally,Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1837
(2002).
The patent laws 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' by rewarding
innovation with a temporary monopoly. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The
monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its boundaries should
be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it enables efficient
investment in innovation.., as part of the delicate balance the law attempts to
maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise of the law to bring the
invention forth, and the public, which should be encouraged to pursue
innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights.
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has been secured, what the patent specifically covers, how long the patent will last,
and what the scope of the protection of the patent 1s. 59 Without patents, venture
capitalists will not knock on the proverbial door. Fledgling company startups with
great ideas for innovative and useful drugs and tests thus require patent protection
of in order to secure investments.
Another type of investment that may be obtained comes from companies such
as Millennium.

60

Millennium began as a venture capital entity, 61 but over the years,

it has taken a patent to state that covers targets that could be used to find small
molecule drugs. These are not drugs that are genomic themselves, but rather are
those that are based on DNA or protein and that act to seek out genetic targets, 1e.,
proteins in the body that the drugs act on in order to affect human disease. Taking
the patent to state that is based on those types of genomic properties and obtaining
investment from larger pharmaceutical companies creates an important partnership
with the jointly assumed goal of developing potentially life-saving drugs. 62 Between
stock offerings, bond offerings and partner investment, sums are raised that can
amount to billions of dollars in the reinvestment process.
The final type of investment, which mainly applies to large pharmaceutical
companies, is the commercial return.63 As stated before, patents on drugs allow
companies to recapture their initial investments by selling the drugs at a profit.
When patent terms expire, generic drugs enter the market, prices go down, and as a
result, the opportunity for regaining the investment dollars fades away. Entire
companies have been built on a single patent; if that patent is challenged, the fate of
the company is just as much at risk as the patent.

9 See generally WHAT You NEED To KNow ABOUT: Biotech/Biomedical, Before You Seek
Venture Capital, Biotech/Biomedical, athttp://biotech.about.com/library/weekly/aabyb-venture
capital.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2002) (demonstrating the factors that venture capital companies
consider before investing in biotechnology and providing tips on obtaining venture capital).
6o See About Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Corporate Overview, at http://www.mlnm.
com/about/overview.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002). Millennium was founded in early 1993 and is
headquartered in Cambridge, MA. A leading pharmaceutical company, Millennium focuses its
efforts on the discovery and development of small molecule, biotherapeutic, and predictive medicine
products, including proteins and antibodies. Id.
61 See Millennium and Hoffman-LaRoche Sign Collaborative Agreement to Apply Genomics
Technologies to Two Disease Areas, at http://www.mlnm.com/news/1994/3-30--0.html (last visited
Oct. 7, 2002) (reporting that the Mayfield Fund led the raising of $8.45 million in seed financing
capital). Other venture capital investors in Millennium are Paine Webber, CW Ventures, Sofinnova,
Inc., Venrock Associates, Greylock Management Corporation, and Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers. Id.
62 See About Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Alliances, at http://www.mlnm.com/about/
alliances/html (last visited on Oct. 7, 2002) (providing a comprehensive table of Millennium's key
partnerships, including a 2001 alliance with Abbott Laboratories focusing on technology exchange
and development in metabolic diseases).
63 See Abbott LaboratoriesInvestor FactSheet, ABBOTT LABORATORIES, at http://abbott.com/
investor/investor fact sheet.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002) (displaying the company's revenue
profile, financial strengths in various products, and sales by country).
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3. Identifying PotentialCures and Profit-Boosters
One major function of these biotech and pharmaceutical companies involves
seeking out the genes with the greatest potential for drug therapy development in a
vast pool of intellectual property. There are, as previously stated, 20,000 patent
applications pending at the USPTO. In each of those 20,000 applications, there may
be between one and 10,000 genes covered in each application. The task of a company
seeking success is to locate the most promising genes and premise their investment
strategies on the research and promotion of their actual and potential uses. The
American patent system, thus, works to incite companies to develop cures for the
public but also provides commercial opportunities for private investors to achieve
financial success.
64
B. Academic Institutions:Considerationsand Dissentfrom the Research Labs

The distaste of the academic community for patenting drugs and genes lies not in the
existence of the system but in its scope. The patent system is in fact absolutely
essential to produce drugs in the United States. Investing $500 to $800 million
dollars only to have someone else swoop in and sell your drug would kill innovation
of such drugs and therapies. There is likewise no question that a patent must
protect such products - protein in a bottle, or insulin, or a growth hormone that will
be injected into a patient for use in a clinical trial. The protection is necessary, but
the reach is too far as it applies to very early research tools.

1. "What's New?"
The dialogue between academia and the legal community began as a naive,
back-and-forth series of discussions. The academic community questioned the
patenting of genes, which it considered products of nature similar to the moon and
the planets. 65 Patent lawyers responded by stating that what was actually going on
involved sophisticated purification, a process done in order to demonstrate utility
66
and encourage innovation.

64 The remarks contained in Section B are those of Eric S. Lander, Ph.D. Dr. Lander is a
Professor of Biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the Whitehead
Center for Genome Research. He is a geneticist, molecular biologist and a mathematician and one
of the driving forces behind today's revolution in genomics, the study of all of the genes in an
organism and how they function together in health and disease. He has been one of the principal
leaders of the Human Genome Project. Under Lander's leadership, the Whitehead Center for
Genome Research has been responsible for developing many of the key tools of modern mammalian
genomics.
6 For a discussion of the academic criticisms, see Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life:
Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 267,
280 (1995).
66 See id. at 288. "The product of nature doctrine has been rendered vacuous by allowing that
the isolation, purification, or alteration of an entity or substance from its natural state turns the
entity or substance into something not 'found in nature."' Id.
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Academics then distinguished patenting the DNA sequencing library from
patenting Penicillin67 and Taxol 68 by noting that in taking all the fragments out of
the human genome, what has occurred is the unmasking and purification of many
individual components. The academics argued that this was not an inventive, novel
purification of individual distinct molecules out of nature. 69
Rather, it was
70
completely laid out in a library, invented by the founders of molecular biology.
They asserted that the patent advocates were promoting a legal fiction by attributing
utility properties to DNA pieces. Isn't it true, they wondered, that most of the claims
in the beginning involved usage of a piece of DNA as a probe in order to recognize
itself by Crick-Watson base pairing? One may as well produce it to use as packing
peanuts - the intellectual content remains the same.

2. Mindless Innovation?
Academics also argued that innovation in genetics was essentially mindless
because of the constant sequence run-throughs. They saw a bad social bargain in
awarding limited-time monopolies to "mindless generic innovation" that they felt
discouraged investment in "hard stuff' and function.7 1 The real work involved
converting the genetic sequence into a therapy.
Patent lawyers responded with Section 103 of the Patent Act, which simply
says that it makes no difference how "mindless" the innovation is. Further, as noted
before, the bar had been raised for patent requirements to include substantial,
7
specific, and credible evidence of utility.

2

The academics then changed the focus of their discontent with the patent
system from the black letter law to the social and economic policies at work. They
saw in the patent system a bargain between society and inventors, in which society
agreed to grant limited time monopolies and inventors agreed to disclose their
67 See
68 See

supra note 46.
supra note 48.

69 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 306-09 (1980) (discussing the "products of
nature" doctrine and holding that respondent's micro-organism constituted a "manufacture or a
composition of matter" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and thus "qualified as patentable
subject matter.").
70
See Human Genome Project Information, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/home.html
(last visited
Oct.
16,
2002)
(demonstrating what has been accomplished with the human genome since its innovation as well as
other information regarding the project).
71 See Timothy Worrall, Intellectual Property B. Patent 3. Patentability a)
Utility
Requirement.*The 2001 PTO UtilityExamination Guidelinesand DNA Patents, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 123, 134-35 (2001).
Since automated sequencing techniques allow scientists to acquire DNA
sequences at a very low cost, obtaining patent rights to such DNA sequences can
be extremely profitable. . . [W]ith very valuable rights available at low cost,
requiring an inventor to assert a specific, substantial and credible utility may
prevent "shotgun" sequencers, who assert only speculative utility for a putative
protein, from obtaining patent protection.
Also see generally,Byron Olsen, The Biotechnology BalancingAct:Patentsfor Gone Fragments, and
Licensing the "UsefulArts",7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295 (1997).
72See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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inventions. The flaw in the system lay in the inherent inequality of the bargain.7 3
Handing monopolistic power to inventors for menial work would create an
unconscionable exchange.
C. EthicalIssues in Patentingthe Genome 74
Early concerns about patenting human DNA had to do with issues like
human dignity, and there was a feeling that granting a patent on a human gene
somehow gave a property right in the inventor over7 5 another person. This was
perceived as some kind of violation of human dignity.
These kinds of arguments
were based on the naive misunderstanding that patents grant ownership for one
thing. People did not understand that the patent system perceives the DNA that is
being patented as something different than the completely natural DNA that is in
the human body.

1. The "Common Heritage"Debate
There was a second variance on the argument that maintains an intuitive
appeal but hasn't reached very far. This has to do with the idea of human DNA as
being part of the common heritage of humanity.7 6 There are some ideas out there
73 Eric Lander compared the disproportionate benefits of the patent system to the Homestead
Act of 1862, explaining, "We didn't just hand away land for walking the boundaries and just filing a
claim - you had to work the claim and really add value to it." For more information on the
Homestead Act, see Homestead National Monument of America, Homestead Act, at
http://www.nps.gov/home/homestead-act.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
71 The remarks contained in Section C are those of Dr. Pilar Ossorio. Ossorio holds a Ph.D. as
well as a J.D. and serves as both Assistant Professor of Law & Medical Ethics and Assistant
Director of the Center for the Study of Cultural Diversity in Health Care at the University of
Wisconsin. In addition to her work at the University of Wisconsin, Professor Ossorio taught law at
the University of Chicago and worked in bioethics research for the United States Department of
Energy in Los Alamos, New Mexico. Professor Ossorio has written extensively in the field of
bioethics and the law and serves on the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights at the National
Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences.
75 See generally Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law, Symposium On
BioinformaticsAnd Intellectual PropertyLaw April 27 2001 - Boston, Massachusetts,Molecules vs.
Information: Should Patents Protect Both?, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 190, 206-11 (Winter 2002)
(presenting a speech made by Professor George Annas on the subject of why patents should not be
allowed on the human genome from the public's view). Annas asserts that perhaps humans are
attempting to assert too much control over nature. Id.
7 See Melissa L. Sturges, Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? An
Application of the Common Heritage ofHumankind, 13 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 219 (1997) (providing a
comprehensive explanation of the "common heritage" platform); see also Maxwell J. Mehlman and
Kirsten M. Rabe, THE GENETICS REVOLUTION. CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND
CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Any DNA to Declare? Regulating Offshore Access to Genetic
Enhancement,28 AM. J. L. AND MED. 179, 183 (2002).
[M]any religious leaders are concerned that gene therapy may be 'one more factor
tending to reduce perceptions of humanity to mechanistic interpretations.' They
fear a more mechanistic view of humanity will result in less focus on values,
ultimately threatening the 'sanctity of human life.' The Universal Declaration on
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that we all have a human genome, and somehow we all have an interest in The
Human Genome. If this is true, the proponents of this position wonder, then how can
only a few inventive entities stake out a position on that human genome and have
rights to it when we all ought to have access to it because we all possess one?
Shouldn't everyone have some kind of universal rights to the human genome as a
77
part of the common heritage of humanity?
There are real problems with the common heritage - common ownership
argument. First, the human genome is an abstract concept - each person has his or
her own genome in his or her body, one that is not the same as another person's
unless that person is an identical twin. It is unclear what it would mean to treat the
human genome as a common heritage.
The human genome is not being depleted by someone who does research on
it. It is not as though a human genome researcher takes someone's genome away
from her in any way. Other things that are treated as part of the common heritage of
humanity, such as forests and other natural resources, are often things can be
depleted. This is not true of the research process that involves the human genome.
Along the lines of this argument, other persons felt that as the genome is
part of the common heritage of humanity, people should not change it inside of the
body.7 8 However, the human genome actually changes all the time, with each
generation. Part of the confusion had to do with the fact that people felt that once
someone had a patent on a transgenetic technology, it gave them the right to use
that technology, which it does not. As stated earlier, patents only grant the right to
exclude others from doing what you have patented. For example, if someone has a
patent on some method of biotechnology, it may still be regulated in ways that
prevent that person from doing activity A, B or C with that technology. Thus, some
of the early debates had to do with genuine ethical concerns about the human
genome, but such concerns are more than likely not to be played out through the
patent system.

2. Access to Information - an EthicalRight for All?
More recently, there has been a real concern voiced about access to
medication and patenting of human DNA as part of a larger question of patenting in
the medical profession.79 The major issue is how patents may inhibit access to
the Human Genome and Human Rights states that the human genome is 'the
heritage of humanity' and that 'everyone has a right to respect for their dignity
and for their human rights regardless of their genetic characteristics.
Id.
77 See

generallySturges, supra note 76.
Id. at 258.
79 See Arti K. Rai, Symposium.*Intellectual Property ChallengesIn The Next CenturyArtile:
The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals:Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and
Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 177 (2001) ("[U]nlike health care
economics generally, prescription drug economics is profoundly shaped by intellectual property
rights, primarily patent rights."); see also Michael J. Malinowski, Legal Development: Globalization
of Biotechnology and the Public Health ChallengesAccompanying It, 60 ALB. L. REV. 119 (1996)
(analyzing the impact of the globalization of biotechnology on access to public health care in the
United States and the United Kingdom).
78
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genetic information in various ways. Also, the interest of the ethicist has moved
much closer to the interest of academic scientists, so that there are real concerns
about patents on biological materials in general. Do patents on publicly-funded
science experiments, including DNA sequences produced with public funding,
undermine the values of academia? Do they constitute or create a double-dipping
situation in which the public pays once to have the initial research done, and then
pays even higher prices again for a final product that incorporates the patented
item?
Patent law, in a sense, is very straightforward in its goals. It is trying to
achieve a public good by getting the highest number of items to the public. Patent
80
law exists to give incentivizing rewards to inventors to create the most public good.
The legal academics ask where the bars should be set in creating this public
good, because for something like access to medicine or access to research tools, the
disagreement isn't involving the public right to the invention versus the private right
of the inventor. Rather, the debate should center on the public's short-term interest
in access versus a longer-term interest in access to more things if a stronger patent
exists.

3. DisineentivizingInnovation
Another concern about academia and patenting what is produced in
academia is whether we will disincentivize the patent system by creating
"incentives" that actually undermine invention and innovation rather than increase
them. This could happen if too many patents are issued, or if there is too much
difficulty in granting licenses for patents between companies and academia. For
example, patents on very early technologies could create "rights stacking."8 1 This
means that in order to produce some final end product, so many patented things are
used, and so many independent negotiations have to be made, that the end product
would never be reached. The red-tape effect would be too expensive and too timeconsuming for potential inventors to deal with, thus creating a disincentive to invent.
These issues create discussions of patent pooling and raising the bar on granting
patents so that they are not being granted for things as their very earliest stages. It
is possible that if the bar is set in the wrong place, invention will be undermined
rather than incentivized.

80 See Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1038 (Fed. Circ. 2001) ("[T]he spirit
and policy of the patent laws encourage an inventor to take steps to ensure that 'the public has
gained knowledge of the invention which will insure its preservation in the public domain."').
81 See John Murray, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 231, 254 (1999) (explaining the issue of "stacking" of patent rights and the subsequent
impact on research, development and sales of patented materials).
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D. The "Canavan"Quandry:a Rare Example of Bad Practiceor Poignant
Representative oflProblemsAhead2
83
As a case study of this entire debate, consider the recent "Canavan" case.
Canavan disease is a terrible genetic disorder in which a child never physically
develops properly, never learns to speak, walk, or talk, and does not live past
childhood.8 4 Ten or fifteen years ago, parents of children with Canavan disease,
dismayed at the lack of research into the ailment, organized to press researchers for
a cure.8 5 They recruited scientists to work with them and gave the very flesh and
blood of their children to perform the research.8 6 At the Miami Children's Hospital,
one researcher who did this work ultimately uncovered the defective gene that
causes Canavan disease; he subsequently patented that gene as well as antibodies to
the gene and everything associated with it.87 The researcher then granted a license
for that patent to a company that essentially shut down genetic testing for Canavan
disease in hospitals nationwide.8 8 The parents of the afflicted children became
89
outraged and are currently suing the academic researchers.

N) The remarks contained in Section D's introduction of the Canavan case are those of Justin
Gillis. See supra note 21.
83 See Peter Gorner, Parents Suing Over Patentingof Genetic Test, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov.

19, 2000), at 1. Along with the New York-based Canavan Foundation and other foundations, the
parents of children suffering from Canavan disease sued Dr. Rueben Matalon and his institution,
Miami Children's Hospital, in federal district court in Chicago on October 30, 2000. Id. The
plaintiffs sought to block the hospital's "commercial use" of the Canavan gene and to recover money
damages based on royalties that the hospital had collected from licensing a patented test that
screened for the Canavan gene. Id. at 9. The Canavan Foundation alleged that it was forced to stop
offering free genetic screening after learning that it would have to pay royalties and comply with
licensing terms it considered burdensome. Id.
81 Id.
Canavan disease affects one in 6,400 children born to Ashkenazi Jewish parents. Id.
The disease destroys the myelin sheaths that protect brain cells and usually causes the infected
children to die between the ages ten and fifteen. Id.
85 See Justin Gillis, THE HUMAN BLUEPRINT. PatentingLife? Gene Research Suceess
Spurs Profit Debate, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 30, 2000, available at http://www.
canavanfoundation.org/news/newswp.html (last visited October 12, 2002).
[W]orking from Matalon's papers, academic laboratories began to offer testing for
Canavan disease to people who might be carriers. Pregnant couples who were
carriers could undergo early prenatal testing to determine if the baby had
Canavan. Work on potential treatments could begin. Along with other parents,
the Greenbergs felt they had wrung an accomplishment from their tragedy.

Id.
86 Id.

U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (filed Sept. 4, 1994; currently withdrawn).
Karen Rafinski, Hospital's Patent Strokes Debate on Human Genes, MIAMI HERALD,
November 14, 1999, at § A, p. 1, col. 1, availableat http://www.canavanfoundation.org/news/
miamiherald.htm (last visited on October 12, 2002). The hospital began enforcing its genetic patent
right by licensing the test for a royalty and limiting the number of tests being done. Id.; see also
Gorner, supra note 83, at 9.
89 See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
87
88
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III. PROPOSALS 90

A. Licensing ProceduresRequire Careful Considerationby Both Researchersand
Industry
In the Canavan situation, the lawyer's clich6, "Bad cases make bad law,"
applies. This case is a bit of the tail wagging the dog. Here is an exception where
there are many difficult issues in terms of how the licensing played out through the
actions of the patent holder. This case should not necessarily be used as an example
that would drive a change in the law, as the issues in this case in particular will
likely be taken care of through the kinds of processes discussed here.
The researcher who applied for and received the patent was the inventor; he
discovered the isolated gene, purified it and devoted his innovation to it. The issues
around who owned the tissue samples are entirely different issues.
The key question deals with access and licensing procedures. When the
holders of gene patent develop their licensing programs, they must be extremely
mindful of the kind of public reaction they will incite - the Canavan case is
demonstrative of this reaction.
The Myriad Genetics case 91 is another example of a licensing system that
proved problematic. The test in this case cost nearly $300. Of that $300, twelve
dollars, or 4%, is devoted to the royalty payment. This payment is a standard royalty
in almost any industry for licensing the patent. The rest of the cost consisted of the
test itself. The issue is whether the licensee company or the hospital was right in
asserting a unilateral right to offer the test. Patent law says that the inventor of the
test has the right to offer it. Is this the smartest thing to do in light of the political,
commercial and public interests in access?
These are examples of biotechnology companies acting poorly. Morallydriven companies would be more careful about these issues. There should be the
utmost care devoted to the manner in which tissues are taken from patients, so that
they are fully aware of what they will be used for. Additionally, patients should
receive proper compensation when it is appropriate, and careful consideration should
be given when deciding how tests will be marketed, and to whom they will be made
available. If nothing else, a company should be concerned with these examples and
should pay closer attention to these issues so that they will not find themselves in a
similar quagmire.
The Canavan and Myriad Sciences cases obscure the real issue, however,
when one considers a case in which a company does not act unethically or poorly.
90The proposals in Section III are gleaned from the remarks of all of the featured speakers as
well as several audience members. This section is meant to reflect a conglomeration of their ideas
and any counterarguments made. For information on statements made by particular panelists,
please
refer
to
the
full-text
transcript
of
the
discussion,
available
at
http://www.wics.si.edu/NEWS/geneticage.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
91For more information on the Myriad case, see Deborah Smith, Test for Cancer Gene May
Cost
Thousands,
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD,
March
14,
2001,
available
at
http://old.smh.com.au/news/lO103/14/pageone/pageone6.html
(last visited on October 12, 2002)
(explaining that the test looks for mutations on two genes that increase the risk of breast cancer).
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For example, imagine a drug company that discovers a receptor, files a patent on it
and now wishes to assert its right to be the only company to screen for a small
molecule against that receptor to treat breast cancer. What would be the company's
response to women with breast cancer who argue that they would benefit from ten
pharmaceutical companies competing with one another to each make the best
molecule to act against that receptor? Economically, this promotes less innovation at
the later stage of research because a monopoly has been granted at this earlier stage.
This is not an exceptional case - this is the rule.

B. The PatentingProcessMust Foster Competition by EncouragingDevelopment to
Continue at LaterStages
Yet part of the issue is also the patients' and public's short-term interest
versus their long-term interest. Patent law accepts that there must be some
restriction, such as higher prices when a patent is in place, in order to encourage
innovation. In theory, that restriction will ultimately increase what the public has.
While this is true, the system gives a monopoly for a very inexpensive
innovation of discovering a receptor, while we learned earlier that it costs $500-$800
million to develop the drug. This is the stage at which you want competition. The
black letter law can support a right to restrict others' access to the innovation vis-Avis a patent. However, a good social policy encourages competition further down the
line, at the development stage; by that time, the innovation is far enough removed
from the therapy.
The challenge for public policy makers, Congress, and the courts is to
determine where to draw the line and develop definitions in this area. Deciding
where to define a research tool exception, for example, when research moves from
purely academic investigation to incorporating commercial motives and benefits can
be nearly impossible without guidance. Universities derive significant revenues from
their research today. Every academic institution hopes to exploit their own patent
portfolio in hopes of keeping their education costs to a minimum.
Those arguments may be based on several assumptions that lack real world
practicability. First, there are only very few instances of people running around
stopping other people from using the receptors to screen for drugs.
The
counterargument to this is that there are countless instances where companies have
dropped their research and development programs because of their clouded patent
portfolio.
However, such instances are not readily apparent. The National Academy of
Science is studying this issue and has commissioned a paper on it that shows that
the pharmaceutical industry gives a de facto research tool exemption that does not
inhibit research. There are also numerous situations in which companies have gone
forward despite that landscape, continuing to develop drugs. Of course, there are
also situations in which this does not happen, and the companies do not push for it.
In reality, there is not nearly the kind of data that one would like to have about the
influence of programs that are dropped. They are not easily seen and are not able to
be captured with the data that exists at present. This is one area in which good
research would be invaluable but does not currently exist.
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Instances where individuals have refused to grant licenses have been few
and far between. Clearly, if a company with two otherwise equal projects must
choose between which to pursue, one of which is a patent mess and the other that is
clean, they will pursue the clean one. However, if the other project is better for or
more important to the good of society, but for the patent mess, the investment should
go there. Companies make these choices all the time; if the one that involves a
patent mess is the one that is more significant, either from what it will do for
medicine or the potential economic returns, the company still must make this
decision.

C. All Partiesto the ProcessMust Establish Standardsfor Determininga 'Real Total
Value" of Investment and Return in Light of the Utility Requirements of§ 103
In a different test case, a real situation, a foundation has a resource of serum
cell lines containing DNA library of 430 multiplex families who are affected by
autism, a complex genetic disorder. The foundation spent $6 million finding the
families, training diagnosticians and flying phlebotomists and pediatric neurologists
all over the county to give the families the best ascertainment possible of the
potential for a cure.
Such foundations and similar academic entities want desperately for biotech
and pharmaceutical companies to come in and work with the samples. They offer to
pay highly subsidized prices for the biomaterials and have a twelve-month exclusive
right to them during which period they cannot give them to any academic researcher.
The foundations want to use the samples, but would not possibly consider giving a
royalty back to organization that funds biological research and autism, especially
when the purple test tube is empty, and there is nothing to be done.
Companies could reply that the system of agreeing to license and never
withhold unilateral licensing, despite being so close to joint inventor status, would be
reasonable for someone else, but not them. What is left for the foundation to do?
How do they get 430 family samples into use?
As patient groups get smarter, they realize that if they are going to give the
flesh and blood of their children's bodies, they should not give it for nothing in
return. Thus, one of the answers that are beginning to be worked out is what kind of
consideration will be offered in exchange for such personal gifts. When the research
products involved do not involve rare genetic diseases, but something that instead
affects many people, perhaps the incentives should be higher. Yet paradoxically,
when a great deal of money is at stake, companies are more reluctant to give it up.
To solve the problem from an economic investor standpoint, companies must
look at the value equation of what they are getting. The more rare the material is
and the more unique the material is, the more valuable the material becomes.
Essentially, the return that you may be able to get from that source is only one factor
in the decision; in fact, it may be the only path to produce the drug that will treat
patients and make the company money.
Companies must recognize the real total value of the innovation. If there is
truly a market for a drug that will be viable as a development candidate, there will
be someone who will pay proper value for it. Again, companies exist that deal with
sources of tissue in ways that are commensurate with the value of what is being
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presented. Possessors of genetic innovations and material must use caution in
choosing the company to develop the drugs so that they receive the rightful benefit of
their bargain.
This issue relates directly to licensing problems.
Despite the close
relationship of innovators and industry, there exists a whole world of economic
theory and political theory that impacts licensing and the ways these deals are put
together; questions of what is reasonable, how to properly structure the deal, and
how to incentivize them play into the procedures. That is, if there was nothing to
license - no intellectual property, trade secret, real property, personal property, or
anything else - this would not be an issue. Sometimes that something comprises a
patent, but in this situation, the problem is more of a licensing problem than a
patenting problem.
There is a learning curve that universities must utilize in order understand
what is rational behavior in patent licensing.
Many times, perhaps, these
institutions do not make good patent licensing choices, and when there is licensing
between public institutions and private ones, whether large or small, the learning
curve must operate. In rebuttal to the argument that the universities have learned
from former mistakes, it is argued that the academic license sources have become
more aggressive, have become more difficult to deal with, and have become less
understanding over time. The higher costs for licenses in connection with this seem
to support such a contention. The system is challenging, and there remains
controversy and kinks to be worked out. There is a pendulum-like, back-and-forth
situation here, in which the academics in the beginning were unsophisticated and
companies took advantage of them. Now, however, the institutions match the
aggression as far as getting the fair market value for their innovations.
An interesting irony exists in situations where people worry that commercial
entities will get patents and then control the licensing process. If the academics at
the universities obtained patents on genome fragments, they could control the access
in that respect. They could have controlled all of the licenses and set the royalties at
nothing. This would prevent the commercial entities from moving in, patenting
something the same or similar and setting the royalties at a greater figure. By
giving up the control in good faith, the institutions actually would be giving up a
significant opportunity for control that the patent system provides.
The debate seems to gain ferocity when one reaches a very nascent stage of
technology, including the uncovering of genomic information. Because this is a de
facto industry standard and not a happenstance problem, this lends fuel to the fire
on both sides. There is little realistic opportunity for an entity to do "their own
thing" and follow different research approaches.
What potentially develops is a bottleneck at the very upstream portion of the
technology that affects all downstream applications. This is why the swirl of issues
surrounding statutory patenting requirements of utility, written descriptions, and
obviousness comes into play again and again. We cannot look at how routine a
particular methodology is to uncover the technology in question because under our
system, that does not matter.
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D. The USPTO and the Courts Should Reexamine the 'Inventive Act" Standardto
Guide the Genomie PatentingProeess
The issue of whether an inventive act occurs is especially troublesome from a
legal perspective and outside the rules of the Patent Act in sections 101,92 10393 and
112. 94 As noted earlier, federal courts have wrestled with the concept of invention in
relation to what the conception of a piece of DNA, a genetic sequence, or a genetic
molecule is. The conception does not actually occur until the sequence information
becomes apparent, as the structure of the chemical molecule remains unknown until
that point. Who is the inventor in this situation? Is it the machine that the genetic
material is deposited into, or is it the person who visualizes the scenario, or is there
an identifiable inventor at all?
One answer to the question disposes of the visualizing person scenario. The
researcher puts the genetic material into the sequencer, and the sequencer produces
the letters. The letters are then piped into a computer, which tells the researcher
what compound or protein the material sequence is like; it is this computer response
that lays out what will be filed in a patent application. In fact, sometimes the
computer response travels directly to a word processing program, which produces a
patent application before a human being ever views it. The issue could be to whom
the invention should be ascribed, but a more important issue may be whether
something such as this should even be considered an inventive act at all.
Perhaps the battleground on utility requirements was the wrong forum in
which to address whether inventive acts are involved in this process. The directly
corresponding issue is whether there is an invention produced at all or whether the
system is being abused, section 103 not withstanding.
Section 103 plays a role in the "invention" argument as an act of Congress
that responded to a particular Supreme Court case that involved a particular set of
facts about how one inventor, in a very traditional, almost American-like way, had a
sudden flash of genius. Similarly, the Supreme Court decided in Feist Pul, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. 95 that a certain level of creativity was necessary to
obtain copyright protection. 96 The Court held that standard telephone book white
pages listings could not be copyrighted because they lacked creativity in their
composition. 97 The opportunity exists for someone to challenge, in a similar manner,
whether there is enough "creativity" or inventorship involved in our genetic research
and patenting procedures. The Supreme Court may be open to such an argument in
the same way the USPTO has been in their policy decisions. The Court would be free

92

35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
95 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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96 Id. at 363-64 ([A]s a statutory matter, 17 U.S.C. § 101 does not afford protection from
copying to a collection of facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly
lacks originality.").
97 Id. at 361. The Court reasoned that "[t]hese bits of information are uncopyrightable facts;
they existed before Rural reported them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never
published a telephone directory" and determined that the arrangement and selection of listings
lacked "the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable
expression." Id. at 361-62.
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to overturn such a decision, and Congress could also take a look at revising section
103 to reflect the recent developments in light of the genome controversy.
A more complicated quandary is whether an entity that discovers and
patents a gene sequence or function may also patent the regulation of its expression
without first discovering a means to do so. Or, must an entity that discovers a way
to regulate the expression of a gene that is patented by another entity license the
right to regulate that gene's expression from the other entity before commercializing
its discovery? From a Patent Office legal perspective, the answer to the first
question would be yes, while the answer to the second is more difficult.
The enabling requirement to patenting something plays into the answers to
these questions. In order to get the bargain of a patent monopoly, the inventor must
disclose not only what she believes has been created or accomplished, but enough
information about it to explain to another how to make and use the invention.
Technically, she could be a disembodied head sitting on a table and never do
anything except tell other people how to create her invention, but she could still
receive a patent if the enabling requirements have been met. If a person has a
blinding flash of inventive genius without having ever set foot in a lab, and that
person proceeds to hypothesize what the experimental procedures and development
tactics could be, that would be sufficient for the enabling requirement. On the
opposite side, a flash of genius or an objective alone is not enough to secure a patent.

CONCLUSION

The general topic of patenting the genome is deceptive in its simplistic
description. Many issues that play heavily into the debate over patenting the
genome were only touched upon briefly in this forum, and others were surely left out
due to time constraints and the broad scope of the issue.
For example, the issue of access to genomic material is one that garners a
great deal of attention. The USPTO works with genomics companies to make sure
that the companies do not, so to speak, kill the goose that lays the golden egg. The
USPTO commissioned a white paper to deal with the question of what happens if
there are too many entities to break through to get licenses for patents. Patent
pooling is a typical solution to this problem, but many questions remain to be
answered.
The discussion surrounding patents and genes and life-saving developments
will inevitably intensify and continue for many years to come. With every bit of
research acquired and every discovery documented, the old questions will breed new
arguments in the academic institutions, the biotechnology companies, the ethical
thinktanks, the USPTO, and the courts. The issue is ripe and will remain so, as
there are no limits to the potential for a better human existence that emerges from
unyielding innovation.
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